Needless to say, many people, thinking that either an injustice had been done, or that they or their organisation had been wrongly criticised, felt it necessary to make further comment.

The Admiralty were facing strong criticism, and had in their defence produced on 15th November, some five weeks after the Court Martial had given its conclusions, an initial three-page minute expressing their concerns. This was followed two weeks later by all 110 pages (including appendices) of the full version. 

The Admiralty were happy with the acquittal of the surviving officers and men; they were not happy -

They finish by saying that the Board of the Admiralty regret criticism by the Court of the action of parties not before the Court, and the failure to call before the Court witnesses who were necessarily in a position to give conclusive information on the subject. 

Two weeks later they produced their 110 page minute

Admiral Sir James Hope, who had been President of the Court, wrote to the Board of the Admiralty with what was an unprecedented minority report, stating that the actions or inactions of Captain Burgoyne and the Officer of the Watch, Lieutenant Purdon, had not been satisfactorily questioned at the Court Martial.

Responding to the Board of the Admiralty, Mr Vernon Lushington, Secretary to the Admiralty, stated in effect that whilst Admiral Hope may well be right, he (Admiral Hope) had been President of the Court Martial which he now said was at fault, and appeared to have written this letter to avoid personal criticism on this point. The Admiral was rebuked.

Sir Spencer Robinson, Controller of the Navy, probably saw in the findings some reflection on his department, for he also wrote to the Admiralty, stating “There was need for caution during the night.........instead of caution we find the reverse.”

A close friend of Coles, Captain Sherard Osborn, had strongly warned Coles during the initial trials about his doubts about the ship’s stability. He joined in the criticism of the findings by writing to the Times complaining that if the doubts raised by the results of the initial stability tests, which had been made available on the 23rd August, had been passed to the ship, the catastrophe could have been averted.

Sir Hugh Childers, First Lord of the Admiralty, and whose son was lost in the disaster, set up his own investigation into the history of the building of Captain. Taking up Captain Osborn’s point about the stability tests, he asked the Controller of the Navy, Sir Spencer Robinson, to report on this matter.

Sir Spencer replied that the stability tests were generally regarded as interesting statistical information only, that designers' calculations were carefully done, and ships were often sent to sea before the tests were done. The test on HMS Captain had shown there was nothing remarkable about the Captain’s centre of gravity, but they had been based on the ship’s forecastle and poop being destroyed, and consequently Robinson, without anxiety, had asked for them to be done again without this assumption; these results were not available until after the loss.

Childers’s report effectively said that although the responsibility for making Captain an effective sea-going man-of-war was that of Coles and Lairds, the Controller of the Navy (Sir Spencer) was responsible for her fitness to go to sea. Sir Spencer should have passed on the initial stability report to the Fleet.

Sir Spencer’s official response stated that HMS Captain was considered safe to go to sea, and she was safe if properly handled. The August 23rd report was put before Mr Childers, whose duty it was to inform the Fleet if he thought it necessary.

With Prime Minister W.E. Gladstone a close friend of Childers, it was perhaps not surprising that Sir Spencer retired shortly after, at the end of his term. A month later, in March 1871, Childers also retired through ill-health, but recovered to take office again the following year.

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